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Abstract
We explore adversarial robustness in the setting in which
it is acceptable for a classifier to abstain—that is, output
no class—on adversarial examples. Adversarial examples
are small perturbations of normal inputs to a classifier that
cause the classifier to give incorrect output; they present se-
curity and safety challenges for machine learning systems.
In many safety-critical applications, it is less costly for a
classifier to abstain on adversarial examples than to give
incorrect output for them. We first introduce a novel ob-
jective function for adversarial robustness with an abstain
option which characterizes an explicit tradeoff between ro-
bustness and accuracy. We then present a simple baseline
in which an adversarially-trained classifier abstains on all
inputs within a certain distance of the decision boundary,
which we theoretically and experimentally evaluate. Fi-
nally, we propose Combined Abstention Robustness Learn-
ing (CARL), a method for jointly learning a classifier and
the region of the input space on which it should abstain.
We explore different variations of the PGD and DeepFool
adversarial attacks on CARL in the abstain setting. Eval-
uating against these attacks, we demonstrate that training
with CARL results in a more accurate, robust, and efficient
classifier than the baseline.
1. Introduction
Many modern machine learning models are vulnerable
to adversarial examples: slight perturbations of natural in-
puts that cause the model to behave erroneously [25]. For
instance, stickers placed on a stop sign may fool an ob-
ject detector to output that it is a speed limit sign instead
[9]. Adversarial examples present a security challenge in
safety-critical applications of machine learning, such as
self-driving cars and medical diagnosis. Much research
has focused on methods for ensuring that machine learning
models give correct output, even when under adversarial at-
tack [10, 19, 29].
However, for many applications, safety under adversarial
attack may be achieved even if the model cannot determine
the correct output, as long as it knows that it is uncertain
about that output. That is, under adversarial attack, it may
be acceptable for a model to give no output, or abstain, for
a particular input that it is uncertain about. For instance, if
a medical diagnosis model believes it is under adversarial
attack, it may give no output and instead tell the user that
further tests are necessary. If a self-driving car detects an
object that it is uncertain about—potentially an adversarial
attack—it could avoid the object, come to a controlled stop,
or ask a human to take over. All of these outcomes are much
preferable to the model giving the wrong answer. Further-
more, they do not require the model to be able to determine
the right answer, only to determine that it is too uncertain to
give one.
Given this line of reasoning, we construct an alternate
definition of adversarial robustness in which a classifier may
abstain on certain inputs rather than determine an output
class. We penalize the model for abstaining on natural, un-
perturbed inputs, but do not penalize it for abstaining on
adversarial examples. This definition implies a tradeoff be-
tween natural error and adversarial error. On the one hand,
the model may never abstain on an input, in which case it
is likely to be accurate on natural data but vulnerable to ad-
versarial attacks. On the other hand, the model may abstain
on every input, which prevents adversarial vulnerability but
is useless on natural inputs. We believe that ideal models
for various applications exist between these extremes. See
Figure 1 for an example of how a model can give correct
predictions for natural inputs but abstain on inputs in adver-
sarially vulnerable regions.
In Section 4, we investigate a simple heuristic for a clas-
sifier to choose inputs to abstain on. We train a robust base
classifier using adversarial training [19] and then abstain on
any input which is within a particular distance γ∗ of a de-
cision boundary of this base classifier. In this case, we de-
scribe the tradeoff between natural and adversarial error in
Theorem 1, which gives a precise value for natural error and
an upper bound for adversarial error given a base classifier
and a margin threshold γ∗.
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(a) Aversarial training (b) Margin-based abstain baseline (c) CARL
class A class B abstain
Figure 1. Classifiers trained on a 2D dataset with classes A (red) and B (blue). Training points are shown along with theirL∞ neighborhood
in which each classifier should be robust; we require that the classifier predicts correctly for natural inputs, but it may predict correctly or
abstain (predict neither class) at every point within the neighborhood. (a) Ordinary adversarial training is robust, but requires a complex
decision boundary that “weaves" between the two classes. (b) The baseline we explore in Section 4 abstains on inputs within a distance
γ∗ of the decision boundary, but remains overly complex. (c) Using the proposed Combined Abstention Robustness Learning (CARL), we
jointly learn a classifier and abstain region, requiring a simpler decision boundary and reduced model capacity.
This baseline has drawbacks. First, determining the dis-
tance to the decision boundary at inference time in a deep
network requires solving a non-convex optimization, which
is computationally expensive even to approximate. Second,
the baseline is inflexible; we hypothesize that we may lever-
age the internal representations of the classifier to learn a
better region over which to abstain.
To address these drawbacks, in Section 5, we introduce
a method for jointly learning the classifier and the areas of
input space on which the classifier should abstain with a
single neural network. We call this method Combined Ab-
stention Robustness Learning (CARL). The setting of ad-
versarial robustness with an abstain option presents multiple
optimization challenges for CARL. First, directly minimiz-
ing the adversarial and natural error is intractable. Thus, we
propose surrogate loss functions for training that allow the
classifier to either predict correctly or abstain on adversar-
ial examples. Second, adversarial examples generated dur-
ing training to enforce robustness must fool the classifier to
both give an incorrect prediction and not abstain.
To solve the second problem, we develop six new varia-
tions of adversarial attacks based on projected gradient de-
scent (PGD) [19] and DeepFool [20] (see Section 6). These
attacks all attempt to find adversarial examples that cause
mis-classification outside of the abstain region. We use
some attacks during training and then perform a compre-
hensive evaluation against the union of all six attacks in the
white-box setting.
We train classifiers using the baseline method and CARL
on MNIST and CIFAR-10. Both the baseline and CARL
produce classifiers which can have arbitrarily low adversar-
ial error at the cost of abstaining on some natural inputs.
Furthermore, training with CARL gives lower natural and
adversarial error than the baseline, showing the importance
of jointly learning to classify and abstain. Our numerical
results can be seen in Figure 7 and Table 1.
We hypothesize multiple explanations for why CARL
outperforms the baseline. First, the baseline uses a single
margin threshold for all inputs; it may instead be more use-
ful to vary the margin threshold in various parts of the input
space. Second, jointly training the classifier and abstain re-
gion with CARL can lead to simpler decision boundaries,
since the decision boundary does not need to “weave" be-
tween neighborhoods of training samples (see Figure 1).
Third, there are other reasons than proximity to a decision
boundary to abstain on an input, such as the input being
far from the training distribution. In fact, classifiers trained
with CARL usually abstain on inputs of pure noise.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We introduce a novel framework for adversarial robust-
ness in which a classifier may abstain on some inputs
rather than output a particular class. This framework is
highly relevant for safety-critical applications in which
the cost of an abstention is lower than that of an incor-
rect output.
• We explore a simple baseline for abstaining on inputs
close to the decision boundary of a robust classifier
and give a precise description of its accuracy-robustness
tradeoff in Theorem 1.
• We propose Combined Abstention Robustness Learning,
a method for jointly learning a classifier with a region
over which that classifier should abstain. We experimen-
tally show that it outperforms the Pareto frontier of the
already-strong baseline.
2. Related Work
Adversarial detection The problem of abstaining on
adversarial examples is closely related to that of detecting
adversarial examples, for which many solutions have been
proposed. However, Carlini and Wagner [6] have shown
that many proposed detectors are vulnerable to attacks that
attempt to fool both classifier and detector. Here, we only
focus on detection approaches tested against these types of
detector-aware attacks, since this is the type of attack we
evaluate against. Pang et al. [21] attempt to detect adver-
sarial examples far from the training distribution through
an alternate training loss and kernel density estimation in
representation space. Liang et al. [18]’s detection method
classifies an input image both before and after applying de-
noising and spatial smoothing; if the two classes output are
not the same, they detect the input as an adversarial exam-
ple. [1] begin with an already-trained classifier and train
an additional detector for each class that attempts to distin-
guish adversarial examples from natural inputs. We believe
that our method CARL outperforms these methods in ro-
bustness and efficiency; a more detailed comparison is in
Appendix E.
Classification with an abstain option Some work has
focused on training a classifier to abstain on certain inputs
[3, 12]. However, little if any work has considered an ab-
stain option in the context of adversarial robustness. While
prior work has focused on adversarial detection, it has not
explicitly described the motivation for detection and its re-
sulting effect on the accuracy-robustness tradeoff.
3. Problem Definition and Robustness Frame-
work
Our formulation of the problem of adversarial robustness
is based around an observation that holds for many real-
world applications: it is okay for a classifier to abstain—
that is, output no class—when given an adversarial exam-
ple.
3.1. Tradeoff Between Robustness and Accuracy
This formulation has a simple solution: just abstain on
every input. Since we would not like classifiers to do
this, we also need to optimize for natural error: on nat-
ural, unperturbed inputs, a model should not abstain, and
should instead output the correct class. Only on adversarial
examples—perturbed inputs which are far from the training
distribution—is the model allowed to abstain.
We thus propose a new framework for studying adver-
sarial robustness with an abstain option. Under this frame-
work, there are two types of error: natural error and ad-
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Figure 2. A conceptual illustration of the natural-adversarial error
tradeoff for an abstaining classifier as defined in Section 3.2. Al-
ways abstaining achieves 0% adversarial error but has 100% nat-
ural error. A nonrobust optimal classifier which never abstains
likely achieves low natural error but may have high adversarial
error. The baseline we describe in Section 4 can find classifiers
between these extremes (orange line). However, we hypothesize
that this baseline can be improved upon (purple line) to train ab-
staining classifiers with a more ideal accuracy-robustness tradeoff.
versarial error. Natural error is the proportion of naturally
occurring inputs to a classifier which are misclassified or
abstained on. Adversarial error is the proportion of natu-
rally occurring inputs which can be perturbed to be both
misclassified and not abstained on. We would like to mini-
mize some combination of these two types of error.
As mentioned above, adversarial error alone can be min-
imized by simply abstaining on every input. Natural error
alone can be minimized by using an optimal classifier with
no regard for adversarial robustness and never abstaining.
Most applications are likely best served by an approach be-
tween these two extremes; Figure 2 illustrates this tradeoff.
3.2. Natural and Adversarial Error
Here, we formally define natural and adversarial error.
Consider an input space Rd and set of labels Y . Then an
abstaining classifier f(·) is a function f : Rd → Y ∪ {a},
which when given an input should either output a label in
Y or the special class a, which means the classifier has ab-
stained on that input.
For an input x ∈ Rd, an adversarial example is a slight
perturbation x˜ of x such that f(x˜) 6= f(x); that is, x˜ is
given a different label than x by the classifier. A slight per-
turbation is often defined as a small distance in some Lp
space, i.e. ‖x˜− x‖p ≤ , although other types of perturba-
tions have been studied [4, 8, 16, 26, 27]. In this paper, we
focus on the L∞ distance.
Denote by D the distribution of input-label pairs (x, y)
and let 1{event} be the indicator function which is 1 if event
occurs and 0 otherwise. Then the natural error of f(·) is
defined as the proportion of inputs which are classified in-
correctly:
Rnat(f) , E
(x,y)∼D
1{f(x) 6= y}
Let Br(x) be the open L∞ ball of radius r around x. The
adversarial error of f(·) is defined as the proportion of in-
puts for which an adversary can cause misclassification and
prevent the classifier from abstaining within such a ball:
Radv(f) , E
(x,y)∼D
max
x˜∈B(x)
1{f(x˜) 6= y ∧ f(x˜) 6= a} (1)
We propose optimizing a weighted sum of these two types
of error, i.e. R(f) = Rnat(f) + λRadv(f). The term λ in
this formulation controls the tradeoff between natural and
adversarial error. If λ is low, then the model may allow more
adversarial errors, but will usually give the correct class for
a natural input rather than abstaining. If λ is high, the result-
ing model will allow few adversarial errors, but may often
abstain on natural inputs; this could be useful for safety-
critical applications where avoiding failures is paramount
and abstaining on an input is low-cost in comparison.
4. A Margin-Based Abstention Baseline
We first investigate a simple baseline for robustly ab-
staining on adversarial examples. The baseline builds from
a classifier g(·) which cannot abstain but is already robust
to adversarial examples; this classifier could be trained by
existing methods such as adversarial training [19]. Define
γ(x) as the geometric margin (distance to a decision bound-
ary) of x for the classifier g(·). That is,
γ(x) = max r s.t. ∀x′ ∈ Br(x), g(x′) = g(x) (2)
The classifier g(·) is extended to one fbaseline(·) that can ad-
ditionally abstain as follows:
fbaseline(x) =
{
a γ(x) ≤ γ∗
g(x) otherwise
(3)
fbaseline(·) will abstain on any inputs which are within a cer-
tain distance γ∗ ≥ 0 of a decision boundary of the classifier
g(·). Intuitively, most natural examples should be far from
a decision boundary in a robust classifier, and most adver-
sarial examples should barely cross a decision boundary.
An issue with this formulation is that for neural networks
it is generally infeasible to compute the geometric margin of
an input. Instead of attempting to compute an exact margin,
we determine whether to abstain by using an adversarial at-
tack at inference time. Say we have a strong adversarial
attack αr : Rd × Y → Rd, which given an input exam-
ple x and label y, attempts to find an adversarial example
x˜ = αr(x, y) such that ‖x˜ − x‖ < r. In general, if an ad-
versarial attack succeeds it provides an upper bound on the
geometric margin:
αγ∗(x, g(x)) 6= g(x) ⇒ γ(x) ≤ γ∗ (4)
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Signed margin
(a) Without margin-based
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0.00 0.05
Signed margin
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PDF for natural examples
PDF for adversarial examples
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Natural error
Adversarial error
Figure 3. A visualization of the tradeoff between natural error and
adversarial error described in Theorem 1. The PDFs of signed
margins for natural and adversarial inputs to an adversarially-
trained classifier on CIFAR-10 are shown. (a) With no abstain
region, the classifier’s natural error and adversarial error are the
areas under the respective PDFs to the left of 0. (b) Adding an
abstain region with threshold γ∗ (green lines) decreases adversar-
ial error (orange region), since more adversarial examples are ab-
stained on; however, it also increases natural error (blue region)
due to false positives. For this classifier, a small value of γ∗ de-
creases adversarial error more than it increases natural error.
If the attack is strong—that is, it always finds an adversarial
example if one exists—then the above becomes a bijection.
Thus, we can apply to the input x an attack that attempts to
change its label within the radius γ∗; if the attack succeeds,
then the input’s margin is less than γ∗. In this case, the
classifier abstains rather than give the output of the base
classifier. Formally,
fbaseline(x) =
{
a αγ∗(x, g(x)) 6= g(x)
g(x) otherwise
4.1. Robustness-Accuracy Tradeoff for Margin-
Based Abstention
The threshold parameter γ∗ in the above formulation can
be used to trade off natural error and adversarial error. In-
creasing γ∗ leads to lower adversarial error, because more
adversarial examples are abstained on, but higher natural
error, because some natural examples are mistakenly ab-
stained on. Given the distribution of geometric margins, we
can give a precise description of this tradeoff. Define the
signed margin γˆ(x, y) of x with respect to class y as
γˆ(x, y) =
{
γ(x) g(x) = y
−γ(x) g(x) 6= y
Now let Γ = γˆ(x, y), (x, y) ∼ D be the distribution of
signed margins for input-label pairs and let FΓ be its CDF,
i.e. FΓ(γ) = P(γˆ(x, y) < γ | (x, y) ∼ D). Then we can
state the following result about the natural and adversarial
error of the derived classifier fbaseline(·).
Theorem 1. Let g : Rd → Y be a classifier and let FΓ
be the CDF of the distribution of signed margins for g(·).
Define fbaseline : Rd → Y ∪ {a} as in (3) with threshold
parameter γ∗. Then for an attack radius ,
Rnat(fbaseline) = FΓ(γ∗)
Radv(fbaseline) ≤ FΓ(− γ∗)
The full proof can be found in Appendix A. While calcu-
lating FΓ exactly is intractable for deep networks, it can be
approximated using an adversarial attack as in (4); see also
Appendix F.
5. Jointly Learning a Robust Classifier and
Abstain Region
The margin-based baseline for abstaining on adversarial
examples described in Section 4 has two drawbacks. First,
it has a fixed tradeoff between natural and adversarial error.
Second, it is computationally expensive to calculate, since
an adversarial attack must be performed against every in-
put at inference time. We propose a method to jointly learn
a classifier and the region over which that classifier should
abstain. This is in contrast to the baseline, in which a clas-
sifier is trained first and then an abstain region is calculated
afterwards.
We propose to train a classifier f : Rd → Y ∪ {a}
which learns to either output one of the classes y ∈ Y in the
training data or an additional “abstain" class a. We would
like f(·) to minimize a combination R(f) = Rnat(f) +
λRadv(f) of robust and adversarial error as defined in Sec-
tion 3.2. However, directly minimizing the 0-1 losses in
these formulations is intractable, so instead we experiment
with surrogate loss functions.
As a surrogate for natural errorRnat, we use the standard
cross-entropy loss. Let pi(x) be the probability assigned
by the classifier f(·) to class i for input x. Then the cross-
entropy loss, also known as negative log likelihood loss, is
given by
Lnat(f) = E
(x,y)∼D
− log py(x)
Often, in adversarial training, the adversarial loss is
given by the maximum of some function `(f, x˜, y) over an
-ball around x:
Ladv(f) = E
(x,y)∼D
max
x˜∈B(x)
`(f, x˜, y) (5)
For instance, [19] use `(f, x˜, y) = − log py(x˜). In the for-
mulation of robustness given in Section 3.2, the classifier
may output either the true class y or the abstain class a
within the -ball. Thus, we would like an alternate formula-
tion of `(f, x˜, y) which is low when either the correct class
Figure 4. A comparison of the true 0-1 loss with surrogate losses
from Section 5 for adversarial examples with an abstain option.
The loss functions are shown as heatmaps in terms of the proba-
bility output for the correct class py(x˜) and for the abstain class
pa(x˜). Each loss is low as long as either the correct or abstain
classes have high probability for an adversarial example.
or the adversarial class is likely to be predicted. In particu-
lar, here are some properties we would like to satisfy:
`(f, x˜, y)→ 0 as py(x˜)→ 1
`(f, x˜, y)→ 0 as pa(x˜)→ 1
`(f, x˜, y)→∞ as py(x˜) + pa(x˜)→ 0
We experiment with two versions of `(f, x˜, y) which satisfy
these properties:
`(1)(f, x˜, y) = − log (py(x˜) + pa(x˜)) (6)
`(2)(f, x˜, y) =
(− log py(x˜))(− log pa(x˜)) (7)
These surrogates are displayed in comparison with the true
0-1 loss in Figure 4. During training, they are used in the
adversarial loss term (5). In the next section, we present
modifications of standard adversarial attacks that may be
used to approximate the inner maximization of this formu-
lation.
6. Attacks on Abstaining Classifiers
We develop multiple adaptations of the standard PGD
[19] and DeepFool [20] adversarial attacks to the setting
where an abstaining classifier f(·) must be fooled to both
misclassify and not abstain. The attacks are useful for
both solving the inner maximization in the adversarial train-
ing approach described in Section 5 as well as evaluating
trained abstaining classifiers.
x x˜
Problem: gradient masking
x x˜
Solution: surrogate loss for PGD
x x˜
Problem: PGD jumps over max
x x˜
Solution: decay step size
x x˜
Problem: stuck in local max
x x˜
Solution: interpolate `cw and `abstain
`(1) `abstain `interp
Figure 5. Various problems we solved when trying to find an adver-
sarial example x˜ during CARL training using PGD. Top: directly
maximizing the adversarial loss `(1) or `(2) is prone to gradient
masking, so instead we use `abstain or `interp. Middle: PGD can
sometimes “jump" over sharp maxima, so we use an exponentially
decaying step size. Bottom: PGD can get stuck in local maxima,
so we vary the loss function from the beginning of PGD to the end.
6.1. Attacks Based on PGD
PGD is an iterative method for attacking a classifier f(·)
given a loss function `(f, x˜, y) which is high when misclas-
sification occurs. At each iteration t, the current input x˜(t)
is perturbed by step size δ in the direction ∇x˜`(f, x˜(t), y).
Then, the resulting input is projected into the ball of al-
lowable perturbations B(x). This process repeats for a set
number of iterations or until misclassification is achieved.
For the standard adversarial robustness setting, a com-
mon choice of `(f, x˜, y) is given by Carlini and Wagner
[7]. Let zi(x) be the ith logit (pre-softmax activation) of
the classifier f(·) for input x. Carlini and Wagner’s loss is
`cw(f, x˜, y) = max
i 6=y
(
zi(x˜)
)− zy(x˜)
Maximizing this loss function reduces the probability the
classifier outputs the correct class y while increasing the
probability the classifier outputs a different class. We can
directly adapt this loss function to the case where our attack
must both fool the classifier and prevent it from abstaining:
`abstain(f, x˜, y) = max
i 6=y,i6=a
(
zi(x˜)
)−max (zy(x˜), za(x˜))
(a) DeepFool (b) DeepFool-Abstain
correct class
incorrect class
abstain region
original input
perturbed input
Figure 6. (a) Because DeepFool does not explicitly consider the
abstain region, it may cross the linear approximation of the in-
correct class’s decision boundary but still remain unsuccessful.
(b) DeepFool-Abstain (see Appendix D) considers the decision
boundaries with both the correct class and abstain class, allowing
it to reach the incorrect class in a single step.
We also experiment with three additional variations for
`abstain(f, x˜, y). Some of these variations depend on the cur-
rent iteration t out of T total iterations of PGD. They are
`sum(f, x˜, y) = max
i 6=y,i6=a
(
zi(x˜)
)− (zy(x˜) + za(x˜))
`interp(f, x˜, y) = (1− t/T)`cw(f, x˜, y) + (t/T)`abstain(f, x˜, y)
`switch(f, x˜, y) =
{
`cw(f, x˜, y) t < T/2
`abstain(f, x˜, y) otherwise
`sum is similar to `abstain except that it sums zy(x˜) and za(x˜)
instead of taking their maximum. `interp interpolates be-
tween `cw at the beginning of the attack and `abstain at the
end. `switch uses `cw for half the iterations and then switches
to `abstain for the remaining iterations. Both `interp and `switch
first attack the true label y and only later also attack the ab-
stain class a.
6.2. Attacks Based on DeepFool
DeepFool [20] is a generalized Newton’s method [2] for
finding an adversarial example x˜ close to an input x. In-
stead of taking uniform step sizes as in PGD, at each iter-
ation t DeepFool constructs a first-order approximation of
the logits zi(·) of the classifier at x˜(t) and then calculates
the smallest perturbation (in Lp norm) to apply to x˜(t) such
that it will be misclassified under the approximation.
We experiment with two variations of DeepFool applied
to the setting where the classifier f(·) may abstain. In the
first variation, we simply target all classes besides the cor-
rect and abstain class. In the second variation, which we call
DeepFool-Abstain, a different approach is used to calculate
the minimum perturbation for each incorrect class. Rather
than only considering a linear approximation of the bound-
ary between the incorrect class and the current class—
which could be the correct class y or the abstain class a—it
explicitly considers boundaries between the incorrect class
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Figure 7. Natural and adversarial error, as defined in Section 3.2, for the margin-based baseline as well as CARL-trained classifiers on
MNIST and CIFAR-10; CARL improves on the baseline. Also, the bound given by Theorem 1 (shown in blue) holds for the baseline.
i and both y and a. For a conceptual diagram, see Figure 6.
For the details of both DeepFool attacks, see Appendix D.
7. Experiments
We evaluate the baseline described in Section 4 and
CARL on the MNIST [17] and CIFAR-10 [15] datasets.
For MNIST, we train a 6-layer CNN and for CIFAR-10
we use a WideResNet-28-5 [28], both with softmax acti-
vations, which we find to be as accurate as ReLU but less
prone to gradient masking. All attacks use the L∞ norm
with  = 0.3 for MNIST and  = 8/255 for CIFAR-10. Our
full experimental setup is described in Appendix B.
7.1. Baseline
We first evaluate the baseline abstaining classifier
fbaseline(·) and experimentally verify Theorem 1. We train
the robust base classifier g(·) with adversarial training us-
ing PGD [19]. Because a successful adversarial attack on
an input bounds its geometric margin (see equation 4), we
can apply PGD to g(·) at a given radius  to estimate the
signed margin CDF FΓ(). We fit a normal (Gaussian) CDF
to the estimates at several L∞ radiuses and find that it is a
good fit for small values of  (see see Appendix F for de-
tails). Using this distribution and Theorem 1, we approx-
imate the natural and adversarial error of f(·) for various
margin thresholds; we use γ∗ = 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 for MNIST
and γ∗ = 0, 2/255, 4/255, 6/255, 8/255 for CIFAR-10. These
theoretical upper bounds are shown as blue plus signs in
Figure 7.
We also implement fbaseline(·) as described in Section 4
by using an adversarial attack at inference time to determine
if an input’s geometric margin is less than the threshold γ∗.
We attack fbaseline(·) with PGD-100 and observe the result-
ing natural and adversarial error for the same values of γ∗;
these results are shown as orange squares in Figure 7. The
natural error predicted by Theorem 1 is close to the natural
error of fbaseline(·) in practice; the adversarial error upper
bound also holds, and is tight for small values of γ∗.
7.2. CARL
Next, we train an abstaining classifier using Combined
Abstention Robustness Learning (described in Section 5)
and the same hyperparameters as the baseline. Our training
loss for an example is given by
L(f,x, y) = − log py(x) + λ `(f, x˜, y) + η ‖Gf (x, y)‖1
The first term is the standard cross-entropy loss. In the sec-
ond term, ` is either `(1) or `(2) given in equations (6-7) and
x˜ ∈ B(x) is chosen via one of the attacks described below.
The hyperparameter λ controls a tradeoff between natural
and adversarial error. In the third term,
Gf (x, y) = ∇x
(
zy(x)−max
i 6=y
zi(x)
)
and thus this term attempts to regularize the L1 norm of the
Jacobian of the network. Others have explored Jacobian
regularization to improve adversarial robustness [13, 23]
and we find that it improves generalization in this setting.
Attacks during training We experimented with
choosing x˜ in the above loss function to directly maximize
the second term. However, we find that the optimization
is prone to gradient masking and often fails to converge.
Instead, we choose x˜ ∈ B(x) that maximizes one of the
loss functions defined in Section 6.1 by using PGD; we find
that attacks using `abstain and `interp work the best. In prac-
tice, a network trained against one of these attacks tends to
be weak against the other, so during training we randomly
sample a function from {`abstain, `interp} and use that to gen-
erate x˜. For MNIST, we use `sum additionally.
We also find that the `abstain and `sum attack sometimes
fails to find small “gaps" between the correct and abstain
classes; the step size during training is large enough that it
jumps over the gap in a single step. Thus, for these attacks,
Natural Inputs Noise Adversarial Error
Defense Acc. Abs. Inc. Abs. `abstain `sum `interp `switch DF DF-Abs Any
Baseline γ∗ = 0 77.1 0.0 22.9 0.0 — — — — — — 50.9
Baseline γ∗ = 4/255 62.9 30.1 7.0 94.0 — — — — — — 29.2
Baseline γ∗ = 8/255 49.7 47.7 2.6 100.0 — — — — — — 11.7
CARL `(1) λ = 1/2 82.1 3.7 14.2 0.0 53.2 40.3 53.7 53.9 54.0 52.6 55.2
CARL `(1) λ = 1 68.1 30.0 1.8 100.0 27.1 13.5 28.7 30.1 25.8 23.6 35.8
CARL `(1) λ = 2 58.2 41.3 0.5 99.7 15.0 10.9 16.0 15.8 13.1 12.2 20.1
CARL `(1) λ = 4 54.3 45.3 0.4 100.0 11.3 8.0 11.0 10.7 7.2 6.8 13.9
CARL `(2) λ = 1/4 76.6 16.8 6.6 100.0 45.1 26.9 42.2 45.2 48.1 45.8 49.3
CARL `(2) λ = 1/3 69.7 27.3 3.0 100.0 29.3 15.1 33.1 35.2 35.9 33.1 40.1
CARL `(2) λ = 1/2 64.4 34.3 1.3 99.9 18.5 10.2 21.4 22.3 15.7 13.7 28.2
CARL `(2) λ = 1 52.8 46.5 0.8 100.0 7.7 4.9 9.0 7.6 4.3 4.1 12.1
Table 1. CIFAR-10 evaluation of the margin-based abstention baseline and proposed method CARL for various loss function variations
and values of hyperparameters γ∗ and λ. First shown is the percentage of natural inputs which are classified correctly, abstained on, and
misclassified. The “Noise" column contains the percentage of pure noise inputs which are abstained on. Finally, adversarial error is shown
for PGD-100 (with the four proposed loss variants), the two DeepFool variants (with 50 iterations), and the union of all attacks.
we use an exponentially or harmonically decaying step size.
See Appendix B.3 for full details and attack parameters; see
Figure 5 for visualizations of how surrogate loss functions
and decaying step size affect the search for x˜.
Evaluation We evaluate our trained networks against
six white-box attacks: four PGD-based attacks using the
loss functions in Section 6.1 and the two DeepFool-based
attacks described in Section 6.2. The adversarial error and
natural error of classifiers trained with various values of λ
are shown as green circles and red triangles in Figure 7. For
adversarial error we use the union of all attacks, i.e. we give
the proportion of inputs which can be perturbed to be both
misclassified and not abstained on by any of the six attacks.
Training with CARL consistently outperforms the base-
line in accuracy and robustness. On MNIST, CARL reduces
the adversarial error of the baseline by more than half while
retaining equal natural error. On CIFAR-10, CARL pro-
duces classifiers that surpass the Pareto frontier of the base-
line. For both datasets, using either the strong baseline or
CARL, we can achieve arbitrarily low adversarial error at
the cost of abstaining on a greater proportion of natural in-
puts. The choice of loss function `(1) or `(2) during training
does not seem to make a significant difference to the result-
ing classifiers’ error rates. As expected, λ allows control
over the accuracy-robustness tradeoff.
Abstention as an indicator of uncertainty CARL
only optimizes the trained classifier to abstain on adversar-
ial examples. However, we find that classifiers trained with
CARL use the abstain class to indicate uncertainty in other
settings. First, these classifiers usually abstain on natural
inputs when they cannot output the correct class. For in-
stance, the CARL-trained classifier on CIFAR-10 with `(1)
and λ = 1 outputs the correct class 68.2% of the time, but
it abstains on 30% of inputs as well, meaning that it only
gives an entirely incorrect prediction for 1.8% of natural
inputs. This is valuable for safety critical applications be-
cause it means the classifier rarely makes mistakes without
understanding that it is uncertain.
Second, classifiers trained with CARL tend to abstain on
inputs of pure noise (see the “Noise" column in tables 1
and 4). Abstaining on noise indicates that such a classifier
expresses uncertainty about inputs which are far from the
training distribution. Hein et al. [11] observe that neural
networks tend to exhibit high confidence on noise inputs;
this problem is largely ameliorated by training with CARL.
8. Conclusion
We have introduced the framework of adversarial ro-
bustness with an abstain option and explored approaches
for a classifier to robustly abstain on adversarial exam-
ples. The baseline approach we present has a straight-
foward accuracy-robustness tradeoff. Our method CARL
improves on this tradeoff and is much more efficient at in-
ference time. Furthermore, it produces classifiers that ab-
stain on uncertain natural inputs and points far from the
training distribution. All these properties make CARL use-
ful for safety-critical applications in which adversarial ro-
bustness is needed. We believe that classification with an
abstain option presents a promising direction for further re-
search into mitigating adversarial attacks; Shafahi et al. [24]
note that using a “don’t know" class may help to overcome
fundamental bounds on robustness. In the future, we hope
to further improve the accuracy-robustness tradeoff of this
formulation, moving towards safe machine learning models
which are robust and uncertainty-aware.
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A. Proof of Theorem 1
Here we provide a full proof of Theorem 1. Throughout
the proof, let g : Rd → Y be a classifier, and let γ(x) and
γˆ(x, y) denote the geometric margin and signed margin, re-
spectively, of g(·) for x. Define fbaseline : Rd → Y ∪ {a}
with threshold parameter γ∗ as
fbaseline(x) =
{
a γ(x) ≤ γ∗
g(x) otherwise
Lemma 1. Let x1,x2 ∈ Rd and y ∈ Y . Then
|γˆ(x1, y)− γˆ(x2, y)| ≤ ‖x1 − x2‖
Proof. Assume that γˆ(x1, y) 6= γˆ(x2, y); if γˆ(x1, y) =
γˆ(x2, y) then 0 ≤ ‖x1 − x2‖ is obviously true. We con-
sider the cases when g(x1) = g(x2) and g(x1) 6= g(x2); in
each case the proof is by contradiction.
Case 1 Say g(x1) = g(x2). Note this implies that
sgn(γˆ(x1, y)) sgn(γˆ(x2, y)) ≥ 0 (8)
Assume the lemma is false, that is,
‖x1 − x2‖ < |γˆ(x1, y)− γˆ(x2, y)| (9)
Without loss of generality, we may also assume that
γ(x1) = |γˆ(x1, y)| > |γˆ(x2, y)| = γ(x2) (10)
Combining (8), (9), and (10), we have
‖x1 − x2‖ < |γˆ(x1, y)− γˆ(x2, y)|
=
∣∣∣|γˆ(x1, y)| − |γˆ(x2, y)|∣∣∣ = γ(x1)− γ(x2)
Then define
r∗ = γ(x1)− ‖x1 − x2‖ > γ(x2) (11)
Let x′ such that ‖x′ − x2‖ < r∗. Then
‖x′ − x2‖ < γ(x1)− ‖x1 − x2‖
‖x′ − x2‖+ ‖x2 − x1‖ < γ(x1)
‖x′ − x1‖ < γ(x1)
So by definition of geometric margin, g(x′) = g(x1) =
g(x2). Thus, we have
‖x′ − x2‖ < r∗ ⇒ g(x′) = g(x2)
This implies γ(x2) ≥ r∗, which is a contradiction since by
(11) we have γ(x2) < r∗.
Case 2 Say g(x1) 6= g(x2). Again, assume the lemma
is false; that is,
‖x1 − x2‖ < |γˆ(x1, y)− γˆ(x2, y)|
≤ |γˆ(x1, y)|+ | − γˆ(x2, y)| = γ(x1) + γ(x2)
Since γ(x1) + γ(x2) > 0, this implies that
‖x1 − x2‖
γ(x1) + γ(x2)
< 1 (12)
Now define
x′ =
x1γ(x2) + x2γ(x1)
γ(x1) + γ(x2)
Calculate ‖x′ − x1‖ as follows:
‖x′ − x1‖ =
∥∥∥∥x1γ(x2) + x2γ(x1)γ(x1) + γ(x2) − x1
∥∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥∥x1γ(x2) + x2γ(x1)− x1γ(x1)− x1γ(x2)γ(x1) + γ(x2)
∥∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥∥(x2 − x1) γ(x1)γ(x1) + γ(x2)
∥∥∥∥
=
‖x1 − x2‖
γ(x1) + γ(x2)
γ(x1) < γ(x1)
The last step is due to (12). Since ‖x′ − x1‖ < γ(x1),
g(x′) = g(x1)
However, a similar calculation shows that ‖x′ − x2‖ <
γ(x2) as well, so
g(x′) = g(x2)
Thus, we have
g(x′) = g(x1) 6= g(x2) = g(x′)
which is a contradiction. 
Given lemma 1, we can prove Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 (restated). Let FΓ be the CDF of the distribu-
tion of signed margins for g(·). Then for an attack radius
,
Rnat(fbaseline) = FΓ(γ∗) (13)
Radv(fbaseline) ≤ FΓ(− γ∗) (14)
Proof. Note that for any event,
E(1{event}) = P(event)
Proof of (13) We would like to prove that
E
(x,y)∼D
1{f(x) 6= y} = P(f(x) 6= y) = P(γˆ(x, y) ≤ γ∗)
It suffices to show that
γˆ(x, y) ≤ γ∗ ⇐⇒ f(x) 6= y
First, we prove that γˆ(x, y) ≤ γ∗ ⇒ f(x) 6= y.
If γˆ(x, y) ≤ γ∗, then either γ(x) = |γˆ(x, y)| ≤ γ∗ or
γˆ(x, y) < 0. If γ(x) ≤ γ∗, then fbaseline(x) = a 6= y by
definition of fbaseline(·). If γˆ(x, y) < 0, then g(x) 6= y. Ei-
ther fbaseline(x) = g(x) 6= y or fbaseline(x) = a 6= y, so
fbaseline(x) 6= y.
Second, we prove the inverse: γˆ(x, y) > γ∗ ⇒ f(x) =
y. Since γˆ(x, y) > γ∗ > 0, g(x) = y. Also, because
γˆ(x, y) = γ(x) > γ∗, fbaseline(x) = g(x). So fbaseline(x) =
g(x) = y.
Proof of (14) Similarly to the case of natural error, for
adversarial error we would like to prove that
E
(x,y)∼D
max
x˜∈B(x)
1{f(x˜) 6= y ∧ f(x˜) 6= a} =
P(∃x˜ ∈ B(x) s.t.f(x˜) 6= y∧f(x˜) 6= a) ≤ P(γˆ(x, y) < −γ∗)
In this case, because of the inequality, we only need to prove
that
∃x˜ ∈ B(x) s.t.fbaseline(x˜) 6= y ∧ fbaseline(x˜) 6= a
⇒ γˆ(x, y) < − γ∗
In fact, we prove the contrapositive:
γˆ(x, y) ≥ − γ∗ ⇒
∀x˜ ∈ B(x) fbaseline(x˜) = y ∨ fbaseline(x˜) = a
Assume that γˆ(x, y) ≥  − γ∗. Let x˜ ∈ B(x), i.e.
‖x− x˜‖ < . By lemma 1,
|γˆ(x, y)− γˆ(x˜, y)| ≤ ‖x− x˜‖ < 
Say γˆ(x, y) ≥ γˆ(x˜, y); then
 > γˆ(x, y)− γˆ(x˜, y) ≥ − γ∗ − γˆ(x˜, y)
0 > −γ∗ − γˆ(x˜, y)
γˆ(x˜, y) > −γ∗
Now say γˆ(x, y) < γˆ(x˜, y); then
γˆ(x˜, y) > γˆ(x, y) ≥ − γ∗ ≥ −γ∗
So in either case we have γˆ(x˜, y) > −γ∗. If γˆ(x˜, y) ≤
γ∗, then |γˆ(x˜, y)| ≤ γ∗ so fbaseline(x˜) = a. Otherwise, if
γˆ(x˜, y) > γ∗ ≥ 0, then fbaseline(x˜) = g(x˜) = y. So
∀x˜ ∈ B(x) f(x˜) = y ∨ f(x˜) = a

B. Experimental Setup
We implement the baseline and CARL using Py-
Torch [22]. All training uses the Adam optimizer [14].
We preprocess images before classification by standard-
izing them based on the mean and standard deviation
of each channel for all images in the dataset. The
MNIST dataset can be obtained from http://yann.
lecun.com/exdb/mnist/ and the CIFAR-10 dataset
can be obtained from https://www.cs.toronto.
edu/~kriz/cifar.html.
B.1. Network Architectures
For MNIST, we use train a 6-layer CNN architecture de-
scribed in Table 2. For CIFAR-10, we train a WideResNet-
28-5 [28]. We experimented with training a WideResNet-
28-10, as was used in the original paper, but found that
WideResNet-28-5 gave close the same performance with
greatly reduced training and inference time. We use soft-
plus activations for all networks, following [23]; we find
that this reduces gradient masking, since the learned classi-
fier functions are smooth.
Type Kernel Stride Output Activation
Input — — 28× 28× 1 —
Conv 5× 5 1× 1 24× 24× 32 Softplus
Conv 5× 5 1× 1 20× 20× 32 Softplus
MaxPool 2× 2 2× 2 10× 10× 32 —
Conv 3× 3 1× 1 8× 8× 64 Softplus
Conv 3× 3 1× 1 6× 6× 64 Softplus
MaxPool 2× 2 2× 2 3× 3× 64 —
Linear — — 256 Softplus
Linear — — 10 Linear
Table 2. The CNN architecture used for MNIST experiments.
B.2. Hyperparameters
All the hyperparameters used in experiments on MNIST
and CIFAR-10 can be found in Table 3. We use identical
hyperparameters for training the baseline and the proposed
method, Combined Abstention Robustness Learning.
B.3. Attacks During Training
During training, we use multiple variations of PGD to
generate adversarial examples, as our experiments found
that training against a single variation led to vulnerabilities
against other variations. In particular, we find that `abstain
and `sum tend to find adversarial examples in small gaps be-
tween the correct class and the abstain class. On the other
hand, `interp and `split tend to find adversarial examples on
the opposite side of the abstain class from the correct class.
For MNIST, we train against PGD using the `abstain, `sum,
and `interp loss functions. PGD with `interp is always run for
T = 10 iterations with step size 2/T = 0.06. However,
the other two loss functions are run until the loss converges;
that is, until∣∣∣`(f, x˜(t), y)− `(f, x˜(t+1), y)∣∣∣ < 0.1
The step size used for these attacks is /(t + 5); that is, it
harmonically decays with the attack step. We find that this
combination of decaying steps size and iterating until con-
vergence is necessary to prevent the network from masking
its gradient during training.
For CIFAR-10, we train against PGD using the `abstain
and `interp losses. On this dataset, PGD is always run for
exactly T = 10 iterations. PGD with `interp uses step size
2/T = 0.006. PGD with `abstain uses an exponentially de-
caying step size 1/2(0.8)t. See Figure 5 for the motivation
for decaying the step size during the attack.
We do not train against DeepFool, leaving it as a previ-
ously unseen adversary to test against.
Parameter MNIST CIFAR-10
Architecture (see Table 2) WideResNet-28-5
Num. parameters 232,170 9,137,690
Optimizer Adam Adam
Batch size 100 50
Training epochs 40 60
Learning rate 0.001, 0.0001 0.001
Learning rate drop epoch 30 —
λ various various
η 0.02 0.02
Attack radius  0.3 8/255
PGD iterations T (train) 10+ 10
PGD loss (train) {`abstain, `sum, `interp} {`abstain, `interp}
PGD step size (train) depends depends
PGD iterations T (test) 100 100
PGD step size (test) 2/T = 0.006 2/T ≈ 0.0006
DeepFool iterations (test) 50 50
Table 3. Hyperparameters used in the MNIST and CIFAR-10 experiments.
C. Additional MNIST Results
Full results for our evaluation of the baseline and CARL
on MNIST are shown in Table 4.
D. DeepFool Details
In Section 6.2, we describe two variations of DeepFool
[20] that can be used to attack an abstaining classifier. Here,
we give a more precise description of the original DeepFool
algorithm and our variations.
D.1. Original DeepFool algorithm
Recall that for the classifier f(x) we denote the logit (ac-
tivation before the softmax layer) for a class i as zi(x). Let
zˆi,j(x) = zi(x) − zj(x), i.e. zˆi,j(x) = 0 if x is on the
decision boundary between the ith and jth classes.
DeepFool is an iterative attack; the attack starts with a
natural example x = x˜(0) and at each step t updates x˜(t) to
x˜(t+1). The attack stops when misclassification is achieved,
i.e. f(x˜(t)) /∈ {y, a}, or after a maximum number of steps
T .
At each step, the attack considers every incorrect class
i 6= y. DeepFool first calculates the nearest incorrect class
under a linear approximation of the decision boundaries as
i∗ = arg min
i6=y
∣∣zˆy,i(x˜(t))∣∣∥∥∇x˜zˆy,i(x˜(t))∥∥1
Then, DeepFool updates the current adversarial example
with the minimal perturbation needed to reach this class un-
der the linear approximation:
x˜(t+1) ← x˜(t) + zˆy,i(x˜
(t))∥∥∇x˜zˆy,i(x˜(t))∥∥1 sgn
(∇x˜zˆy,i(x˜(t)))
In the abstain setting, we make three small adjustments.
First, we modify the function zˆy,i(x˜(t)):
zˆy,i(x˜
(t)) = max
(
zy(x˜
(t)), za(x˜
(t))
)
− zi(x˜(t))
Second, when calculating i∗, we consider the minimum per-
turbation for i /∈ {y, a} since our attack must fool both clas-
sifier and abstain class. Finally, the attack does not stop un-
til the classifier outputs neither the correct class y nor the
abstain class a.
D.2. DeepFool-Abstain
While the above modification of DeepFool for the ab-
stain setting works in many cases, it only considers a single
decision boundary it must cross at each step. However, this
may cause the algorithm to sometimes cross the incorrect
class’s decision boundary but still remain in the abstain re-
gion (see Figure 6). Thus, we developed a second variation
of DeepFool called DeepFool-Abstain, which we describe
here.
Again define zˆi,j(x) = zi(x) − zj(x). At each step
of DeepFool-Abstain, the attack considers every incorrect
class i /∈ {y, a}. For each such i, it constructs a linear
approximation of the boundaries between the incorrect class
and both the correct class y and abstain class a:
Li,y(x˜
(t) + δ) = zˆi,y(x˜
(t)) + δ∇zˆi,y(x˜(t))
Li,a(x˜
(t) + δ) = zˆi,a(x˜
(t)) + δ∇zˆi,a(x˜(t))
Natural Inputs Noise Adversarial Error
Defense Acc. Abs. Inc. Abs. `abstain `sum `interp `switch DF DF-Abs Any
Baseline γ∗ = 0 98.4 0.0 1.6 0.0 — — — — — — 8.0
Baseline γ∗ = 0.1 96.7 2.6 0.7 90.2 — — — — — — 4.2
Baseline γ∗ = 0.2 94.6 5.0 0.4 98.3 — — — — — — 0.6
Baseline γ∗ = 0.3 92.1 7.7 0.0 96.2 — — — — — — 0.0
CARL `(1) λ = 4 98.7 1.0 0.2 100.0 3.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 4.3 4.3 4.8
CARL `(1) λ = 8 98.4 1.4 0.2 100.0 2.9 0.3 0.0 0.0 3.4 3.4 3.8
CARL `(1) λ = 16 98.7 1.0 0.2 100.0 3.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 4.3 4.3 4.8
CARL `(2) λ = 1 99.3 0.2 0.5 100.0 4.1 4.6 0.0 0.0 4.6 4.3 6.4
CARL `(2) λ = 2 99.2 0.2 0.5 100.0 4.8 0.7 0.0 0.0 5.3 4.9 6.7
CARL `(2) λ = 4 97.0 2.8 0.2 100.0 2.2 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.9 3.0 3.4
Table 4. Identical evaluation to Table 1 but for MNIST.
The algorithm attempts to update x˜(t) to x˜(t+1) by adding a
perturbation δ such that both these approximations are pos-
itive; that is, the updated adversarial example x˜(t+1) is mis-
classified to be neither the correct class y nor the abstain
class a. We would also like the L∞ norm of the perturba-
tion update δ to be as small as possible to avoid moving the
adversarial example outside of the acceptable perturbation
neighborhood. This can be written as
minimize ‖δ‖∞
such that Li,y(x˜(t) + δ) ≥ 0
Li,a(x˜
(t) + δ) ≥ 0
(15)
We solve this convex optimization problem exactly for δ
using the algorithm of Cadzow [5], which has time com-
plexity O(d) where d is the input space dimension. Then,
the updated adversarial example x˜(t+1) is given by
x˜(t+1) = proj
(
x˜(t) + δ,B(x)
)
That is, δ is added to the current adversarial example and
then the result is projected into the ball of allowed adversar-
ial examples.
See Algorithm 1 for an overview of the DeepFool-
Abstain attack. Figure 6 shows an example of a single it-
eration of the attack.
E. Additional Comparisons to Related Work
Here we expand upon the descriptions of and compar-
isons to related work from Section 2.
Pang et al. [21] use an alternate training loss, reverse
cross-entropy, to cluster inputs along a low-dimensional
manifold in the final hidden layer’s space of representations.
They then detect as adversarial examples all inputs which
produce a hidden layer representation far from this man-
ifold by using kernel density estimation. They show that
a detector-aware attack usually needs to apply macroscopic
noise to generate an adversarial example that is not detected.
Algorithm 1 The DeepFool-Abstain attack.
x˜(0) ← x
for t = 0, . . . , T − 1 do
if f(x˜(t)) /∈ {y, a} then
x˜← x˜(t)
return x˜
else
solve (15) for δ
x˜(t+1) ← proj (x˜(t) + δ,B(x))
end if
end for
x˜← x˜(T )
return x˜
One downside of their approach is that inference time com-
plexity scales with the size of the training dataset. They do
not report accuracy against this attack, so our method can-
not be directly compared.
Liang et al. [18]’s detection method classifies an input
image both before and after applying denoising and spatial
smoothing. If the two classes output are not the same, they
detect the input as an adversarial example. However, their
defense is still vulnerable to attack on 67% of MNIST test
samples; in contrast, our method CARL is vulnerable less
than 5% of the time (see Figure 7 and Table 4).
[1] begin with an already-trained classifier and train an
additional detector for each class that attempts to distin-
guish adversarial examples from natural inputs. At infer-
ence time, the original classifier determines a class for an in-
put; then, the corresponding detector is applied to determine
if that input is adversarial. However, their defense remains
worse than adversarial training when defending a detector-
aware attack on MNIST; in contrast, our method strongly
outperforms adversarial training in both accuracy and ro-
bustness (see Figure 7 and Table 4). Their method also re-
quires training a separate network for every class, whereas
ours uses a single network, improving training time.
Classification with an abstain option Some work has
focused on training a classifier to abstain on certain inputs.
Herbei and Wegkamp [12] explore the Bayes-optimal ab-
stention rule and its approximation in practice. Bartlett and
Wegkamp [3] learn a classifier using a variation of the hinge
loss modified for the abstain setting. However, little if any
work has considered an abstain option in the context of ad-
versarial robustness. While prior work has focused on ad-
versarial detection, it has not explicitly described the moti-
vation for detection and its resulting effect on the accuracy-
robustness tradeoff.
F. Calculating the Signed Margin Distribution
To use Theorem 1, we need to estimate the signed margin
distribution for the base classifier g(·), since the theorem
bounds are based on its CDF FΓ. We estimate the distri-
bution with two steps. First, we attack the base classifier
g(·) with a number of adversarial attacks at varius radii. As
stated in (4), an attack αr succeeding at a given radius r in-
dicates that the signed margin is less than that radius. Thus,
if the attack is strong enough, we can approximate the CDF
of Γ:
FΓ(r) = P
(x,y)∼D
(γˆ(x) ≤ r) ≈ P
(x,y)∼D
(g(αr(x, y)) 6= y)
That is, for a given radius r the value of FΓ(r) is the
proportion of attacks that succeed at that radius.
Once we have approximated FΓ(r) for several values of
r, we fit a normal CDF to the resulting values and find that
it is a good fit for small positive values of r. Since FΓ is
usually evaluated at small positive values in theorem 1, we
use this normal approximation of Γ to calculate the bounds
shown in Figure 7.
For the adversarially trained classifier on MNIST, we
find that Γ ∼ N (0.887, 0.4272) is a good approximation.
For the adversarially trained classifier on CIFAR-10, we
find that Γ ∼ N (0.0298, 0.04062) is a good approxima-
tion. The fit of these distributions to the experimental data
is shown in Figure 8.
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Figure 8. We approximate the distribution Γ of signed margins
for the adversarially trained base classifier g(·) by a normal dis-
tribution. First, quantiles of the distribution are estimated via an
adversarial attack; then, a normal CDF is fit to those quantiles.
